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All of the above suggests that altering 
the minimum wage may avoid the prob-
lems of taxation [to finance the wage 
subsidy in manufacturing], administra-
tion, and interference with individual 
mobility attendant to the policy package 
just discussed. Income and wage policies 
designed to narrow the rural-urban wage 
gap have been suggested by D. P. Ghai, 
and Tanzania has formally adopted such 
a policy along with migration restric-
tion. In the final analysis, however, the 
basic issue at stake)s really one of 
political feasibility and it is not at all 
clear that an incomes policy is any more 
feasible than the alternatives. [po 138] 
In a brilliant and pioneering paper, John 
Harris and Michael Todaro introduced a 
model with two sectors, manufacturing 
(urban) and agriculture (ruraI), a (sticky) 
minimum wage in manufacturing and con-
sequent unemployment. They also intro-
duced a labor allocation mechanism under 
which, instead of the usual equalization of 
actual wages, the actual rural wage was 
equated with the expected urban wage; the 
latter was defined as the (sticky) minimum 
wage weighted by the rate of employment, 
so that, unlike in the standard rigid-wage 
models of trade theory (for example, Gott-
fried Haberler, Bhagwati, Harry Johnson, 
Louis Lefeber, and Richard Brecher), the 
unemployment resulting from the minimum We argue in this paper that this dilemma 
wage is to be construed as specific to the is unnecessary in principle, the reasons being 
urban sector. that: 
In the context of this model, Harris and 1) a uniform wage subsidy, regardless 
Todaro analyze two policies: 1) a wage of the sector of employment, will yield the 
subsidy policy in the manufacturing sector optimal, first best solution; 
(alone); and 2) a labor-mobility restriction 2) equivalently, a wage subsidy in 
policy. They argue that the former, as well manufacturing plus a production subsidy to 
as the latter, can be used to improve welfare, agriculture will yield the optimal, first best 
defined as a function of available goods in solution; 
the usual way; but that, to attain the optimal ~ 3) in either case, no resort to "ethical 
first best solution, both policies are necessary. compromises" in the direction of sanctioning 
The authors express regret at the necessity migration restrictions will be necessary; 
of using migration restrictions in view of the 4) proposition 2) implies that the au-
" ... ethical issues involved in such a thors' argument that the traditional pre-
restriction of individual choice and the com- scription to use shadow pricing of labor 
plexitr and arbitrariness of administration" (i.e., a wage subsidy in employment) is 
and end their exercise with the sentiment inapplicable to their model is not correct 
that: and their conclusion stems from equating 
this prescription with the prescription that 
the wage subsidy be given for employment in 
the manufacturing sector alone; and 
• Professors of economics, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology and the Indian Statistical Institute, re-
spectively. The paper was written while Srinivasan was 
visiting professor of economics at M.I.T. and the re-
search underlying it has been supported by the Na-
tional Science Foundation. The paper has profited from 
seminars at Minnesota, Stanford, and Harvard. Thanks 
are due to David McClain for computational assistance, 
and to Peter Diamond, John Hams, John Chipman, 
Anne Krueger, and a referee for helpful comments. 
soz 
5) proposition 2) also implies that the 
authors' contention that two policies are 
necessary to attain the first best optimum is 
not valid unless one construes a general 
wage subsidy to constitute two policies when 
there are two sectors employing labor. 
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In demonstrating these propositions, we 
should note that the Harris-Todaro formal 
model has a demand function which is not 
related to the utility function in their (later) 
welfare analysis, so that their analytical 
system is open to the possibility of being 
overdetermined. We therefore rewrite their 
model, with the utility function explicitly 
incorporated into the model, eliminating 
the "additional" demand equation of Harris 
and Todaro. 
Since the basic problems with the Harris-
Todaro analysis relate to their first best 
optimal-policy characterization, we begirt 
with analysis of the first best, optimal policy 
in the model.1 However, we also take the 
opportunity to extend the analysis in Sec-
tion II to two second best policy measures: 
wage subsidy in manufacturing and produc-
tion subsidy to agriculture; both policies 
can be shown to be equivalent, singly or in 
combination, to all other conceivable policy 
interventions in the model. However, rather 
than prove these results with rigor-we 
have done this 1!lsewhere in a companion 
paper-we produce numerical examples in 
the Appendix to establish and illustrate the 
least intuitive among them. 
t. The Model 
We may now restate the Harris-Todaro 





XM ;:;i jJl(LJI) 
where X A and X M are the output levels of 
agriculture (rural sector) and manufactures 
(urban sector), respectively, and LA, LM are 
the labor-input levels in the two sectors. 
The functions are strictly concave. The labor 
supply is fixed and assumed to be unity by 
choice of units: 
(3) 
We then have a standard, social utility func-
tion: 
(4) 
1 An error of detail is picked up later in this paper. 
XA 
DE is the production possibility ~rve when wage 
rigidity is absent. With the wage rigidity constraint, 
equilibrium production under laissez-jairt can lie only 
along RK instead of RD, because eqUilibrium on RD . 
(excluding R), as at S, implies wage in manufacturing 
below the minimum wage. Q is the laissez:faire produc-
tion point under price-ratio QG under the wage con-
straint. For simplicity, the diagram depicts the price-
ratio at Sand Q to be identical, implying tither a linear 
utility function for a closed economy or a "small," open 
economy with unchanging terms of trade. The formal 
analysis in the text is not restricted to linear utility 
functions; but it does not apply, without amendment, 
to a "large" open economy with monopoly power in 
trade. 
FIGURE 1 
where U is concave with positive marginal 
utilities for finite [XA , X M ]. 
For a fully competitive economy,' the 
resulting equilibrium can be shown in Figure 
1 at S where the production possibility 
curve DE is tangent to SS' and 
(5) 
with uti U2 equal to the negative of the 
slope of SS', and Ul and Ut representing the 
partial derivatives of U with respect to X A 
and X M , respectively. 
But we now assume that the wage in 
manufacturing is fixed as a minimum, so 
that for this competitive economy, we must 
have: 
(6) 
If we then assume that this constraint is 
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binding at S, the first best optimal solution 
is inadmissible and unemployment ensues.2 
The system could then have been character-
ized nonetheless by the equalization of 
actual wages in the two sectors. Harris and 
Todaro, however, chose to rewrite the wage-
equalization equation in terms of the ex-
pected wage in manufacturing, defined as 
the actual wage there weighted by the rate 
of employment, so that the critical equili-
brium conditions in their model, relevant for 
our analysis, are 
(7) f'M = W 
U1 , LM 
-fA=W---
U2 1 - LA 
(8) 
where the total labor force is assumed to be 
one by choice of units and where consump-
tion and production price of the agricultural 
good is identical and equal to Ut/U2• 
With W specified, (7) and (8) can be solved 
for LM and LA, using the two production 
functions. The laissez-faire equilibrium, with 
unemployment (LM < l-LA ), will then lie 
in Figure 1 along RK (where X M and hence 
LM are fixed at the value that makesfM=w) 
at Q. (It may be emphasized that the laissez-
faire equilibrium would so lie along RK even 
if actual wages were equalized in the two 
sectors: nothing critical to our interests 
hangs on the expected-wage wrinkle in the 
Harris-Todaro analysis.) 
As for the available policy instruments 
(that use the price mechanism as distinct 
from direct allocation mechanisms) in this 
model, we note now the following: 
(i) laissez1aire; 
(ii) wage subsidy in manufacturing; 
t Needless to say, unemployment is inevitable only if 
we assume that the unemployed labor will not prefer 
certain employment at a lower wage in the agricultural 
sector to uncertain employment in the manufacturing 
sector at a higher wage. One has to contemplate there-
fore either a randomized process by which everyone in 
the manufacturing labor force gets an equal crack at the 
manufacturing jobs, so that each on the average gets the 
expected wage or that the unemployed workers return 
to employment in the agricultural sector. In the latter 
case, we could wind up with the wage-differential, full 
employment model which has already been extensively 
analyzed in trade-theoretic literature. 
(iii) production subsidy to agriculture. 
The structure of the model also implies the 
following equivalences: 
(iv) a wage subsidy in agriculture is equal 
to policy (iii);3 
(v) a uniform wage subsidy in all employ-
ment is a combination of policies (ii) 
and (iii); 
(vi) for a closed economy, a consumption 
tax-cum-subsidy is equivalent to 
policy (iii), i.e., a production tax-
cum-subsidy;· 
(vii) for an open economy, a tariff (trade 
subsidy) policy would, as usual, be 
equivalent to policy (iii), i.e., a pro-
duction tax-cum-subsidy policy, plus 
a consumption tax-cum-subsidy 
policy.5 
One final point may be noted. Our analysis 
does not explicitly distinguish between a 
3 We are assuming, in writing equation (7), that the 
producer and consumer prices of the manufacturing 
good (in terms of any arbitrary unit of account) are the 
same, i.e., in effect, the producers ~f the manufacturing 
good are paying the workers the wage 'iii in kind. Hence, 
the effect of a production subsidy to manufacturing is 
essentially not to affect any real decisions, as those 
made via equations (7) and (8), but merely to increase 
each commodity price in terms of the (arbitrary) unit 
of account. However, if we were to assume instead that 
the producer and consumer prices of the manufacturing 
good could be made to differ by policy, then the worker 
in manufacturing would earn the value of his marginal 
product at the producer price and then, qua consumer, 
must have enough income (in terms of the unit of ac-
count) to buy 'iii units of the manufacturing good. In 
that case, a wage subsidy policy to manufacturing 
would be equivalent to a production subsidy policy to 
manufacturing, as is the case in the agricultural sector. 
Thus note that, if we did shift to the latter, alternative 
assumption on wage payment in the manufacturing 
sector, then the analysis would not change but our 
policy equivalences would. In particular, the first best 
optimal policy mix would then include: a uniform pro-
duction subsidy to both sectors; and a production sub-
sidy in manufacturing and a wage subsidy in agricul-
ture. 
4 Thus, let 1rp=wLM/(l-LA)!A' be the production 
price of the agricultural good and 'R'c= U.[XA' XMlI 
U2 [XA , XM 1 be the consumption price of the agricul-
tural good. The production tax-cum-subsidy is then 
('R'p-1rc)/1rc; and the consumption tax-cum-subsidy is 
(1rc-1rp)/1rp ' 
6 Thus, if 1r* is the international price of the (import-
able) agricultural good, a tariff at ad valorem rate t would 
imply: ",*(l+t)='R'p=1rc' 
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closed and an open economy. Since it relates 
essentially to the production equilibrium in 
the economy, and since it allows the utility 
function to be linear or non-linear, it can be 
interpreted as applying either to a closed 
economy or to an open economy with given 
terms of trade. a 
II. Optimal Policy Intervention 
It is easy to see that the first best optimum 
can be reached in this model by the use of a 
uniform ,wage subsidy or, equivalently, by 
the use of a wage subsidy in manufacturing 
and a production subsidy to agriculture. 
Thus, let 
.' I. S = W - 1M(LM) 
be the wage subsidy (financed by appropriate 
lump sum taxation) in manufacturing, with 
the asterisks denoting first best values. If 
this subsidy is also extended to employment 
in agriculture, we should write the equili-
brium condition in production as: 
, . 
(9) 1M = w - s . , . 
(10) 7('.1A = w - s 
where r:= Ul(X~, Xt,.)IU2(X!, XM ) is the 
consumption' price (equal to the producer's 
price 'I(:=11111D of the agricultural good. 
It is clear then that the constraints of the 
model are met (Le., the wage rate in -manu-
facturing is at wand the wage rates are 
equalized at the producer's prices in both 
sectors) and full employment optimal equili-
brium is reached with wage subsidy at level 
s· in both sectors. Thus, in Figure 2 (which 
illustrates for a closed economy case), the 
resulting full employment, optimal equilib-
rium is at S, with 'I(! = 7(':, (and the domes-
tic, marginal rates of transformation in 
production and in consumption are equal at 
S). 
Alternatively, we could have used a wage 
subsidy in manufacturing (alone) at level s· 
• The analysis would have to be amended to bring in 
the foreign reciprocal demand function explicitly into 
the formal model if we were to consider the case of a 
country with monopoly power in trade. For a "small," 
open economy, the analysis in the text for a linear utility 
function would be applicable without modification. 
".:1"".: for wage subsidy to manufacturing 
!!!.!!! production subsidy 
o to agriculture I 




S is the first 'best, optimum for a closed economy, 
with the social utility curve U* tangent to the produc-
tion possibility curve DE. A suitable, uniform wage 
subsidy to both sectors, A and M, will equate the con-
sumption and production prices with the domestic 
rates of transformation in production and substitution 
in consumption at S. A suitable wage subsidy to manu-
facturing plus production subsidy to agriculture will 
not equate the consumption and production prices but 
will equate the two rates of substitution in consumption 
and transformation in production at S with each other 
and with the consumption price alone. 
FIGURE 2 
and combined it with a 'production su\>sidy 
in agriculture. Thus, with 
• ,w 7(' =----
", f~(L"1) 
as the producer'S price of the agricultural 
good,and' 7(': as the consumer's pJ;"ice of the 
agricultural good, as before, we have: 
• * • 7('" - 7('. 
t =---
'1(* • 
as the optimal subsidy to- agriculture. With 




, - .' 1M = W - S 
• • , ' LM 
1f',,1A = W = '10.----
1- L1 
and, once again, we note that the constraints 
in the model are met, and full employment, 
optimal equilibrium is reached with wage 
Copyright © 2001 All Rights Reserved 
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QH is the locus of production equilibria, traced out 
by increasing the wage subsidy in manufacturing from 
s=O to Smax yielding full employment at H. QR is the 
locus of production equilibria, traced out by increasing 
the production subsidy to agriculture. While the dia-
gram assumes the linear utility function case, as does 
Figure I, for sake of simplicity, the formal analysis in 
the text is not so restricted. Note that, in the restricted 
case illustrated here, an increasing wage subsidy to 
manufacturing would necessarily reduce agricultural 
output; not so, in the general case which admits non-
linear utility functions. 
FIGURE 3 
subsidy in manufacturing at level s* and 
production subsidy to agriculture at rate t*. 
However, while the equilibrium is again 
optimally at S, it is characterized now by 
r:¢r: (though of course the domestic, 
marginal rates of transformation in produc-
tion and substitution in consumption remain 
equal to each other and identical to that 
under the uniform wage-subsidy policy at S). 
Hence we have established the validity 
of criticisms 1}-5} leveled at the Harris-
Todaro analysis at the ol1tset of this paper. 
III. Second Best Policy Intervention 
The two second best policies which then 
can be considered are: a wage subsidy to 
manufacturing (considered by Harris-Todaro 
at some length); and a production subsidy 
to agriculture (not considered by Harris-
Todaro, although their "migration-restric-
tion" policy is the "quota-equivalent" 
thereof). 
Wage Subsidy in Manufacturing: We only 
sketch here briefly the analysis of this policy 
as the Harris-Todaro results are totally 
correct.7 With s as the wage subsidy in 
manufacturing, the equilibrium is now char-
acterized by: 
(13) j ' -M = w-s 
U1 I LM 
-iA=w'--
U2 1- LA 
(14) 
Clearly, given 1z, and s, (13) and (14) can be 
solved for LM and LA. We can then demon-
strate (see our 1973 paper) that: 
Starting from a laissez1aire equilibrium 
(s=O), on RK at Q in Figure 3, increasing s 
means shifting the production equilibrium Q 
steadily north; 
the locus of successive production 
equilibria, mapped out by increasing s, 
must reach full employment (at an Smax) on 
the production possibility curve: such a 
locus being QH;g 
the full employment equilibrium may 
be inferior welfarewise to laissez-faire-a 
proposition which we illustrate with a nu-
merical example in the Appendix; 
a wage subsidy will necessarily improve 
welfare (i.e., dU/ds>O at s=O); and 
the second best wage subsidy need not 
be characterized by full employment, so 
that tradeoff possibilities between increased 
welfare (tlia a standard social utility func-
tion of the type deployed by Harris and 
Todaro, and in this paper) and reduced un-
employment may be pertinent. 
Production Subsidy to Agriculture: For the 
case where the policy instrument is a pro-
duction subsidy to agriculture, the equilib-
7 We have also developed the second best analysis at 
much greater length, and with formal rigor, in the com-
panion paper cited earlier. Instead, we give numerical 
examples in the Appendix to illustrate the major propo-
sitions listed here. 
8 Harris and Todaro incorrectly argue, p. 134, that 
the full employment equilibrium with a wage subsidy 
in manufacturing can be inside DE, off the production 
possibility curve. They forget that labor is the only 
factor in the model, in effect; they seem to have erred 
by relying on analogy with the standard two-factor 
model. 
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rium conditions are clearly rewritten as: 
(15) 
(16) 




where, as before, 7r" is the producer's price 
of the agricultural good and the implied 
production subsidy is (7r,,- Ut!U2)/(Ut/ U2). 
Clearly, given 7r" and 'lV, we can solve for 
LM and LA. It is also then easy to show that: 
Stp.rting from a laissez-faire equilibrium 
(11',,= ut/U2) , on RK at Q in Figure 3, 
increasing 11'" wi1l steadily shift the produc-
tion equilibrium to the right along QR until 
full employment is reached at i"" at R; 
the equilibrium at R is also the second 
best optimal equilibrium, so that the full 
employment, second best equilibrium is 
reached when 7r" = i"p and there is an implied 
production subsidy to agriculture; and 
the second best wage subsidy in manu-
facturing cannot be ranked uniquely with 
the second best production subsidy to agri-
culture-as illustrated by a numerical exam-
ple in the Appendix. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Where do the migration-restriction policies 
of Harris and Todaro fit in? 
, ,If one is willing to con template direct, 
physical allocations, one can, clearly reach 
the first best, optimal solution, S in Figure 1, 
by assigning the corresponding labdr to the 
two sectors (L~ and L~) and enfor,cing the 
rule that all labor be employed regirdless of 
private profitability (thus yieldirigjX~ and 
n). The Harris-Todaro policyipackage for 
reaching S, consisting of a wage subsidy in 
manufacturing and migration restrictions is 
thus a "mixed" package: one policy being 
of the price-mechanism variety and the other 
of the direct physical-mechanism variety. 
One could equally turn this mixed package 
on its head and have manufacturers forced 
to employ all available labor and let a pro-
duction subsidy to agriculture allocate the 
labor force at the optimal values (L~ 
and L~). 
Nothing can be said, in principle, about 
the relative suitability of all these equivalent 
alternatives without bringing in other con-
siderations, including the ethical considera-
tions mentioned by Harris and Todaro, 
to introduce I!symmetries/nonequivalences 
among them. 
Further, as for second best policies, we 
might be able to justify the Harris-Todaro 
concentration on the wage subsidy to manu-
facturing policy, as against a uniform wage 
subsidy policy, on feasibility grounds. It may 
well be that the government's capacity to 
inte.rvene is confined to the (modern) urban 
sector and that a wage subsidy in agricul-
tural employment is infeasible. This is, 
ho~ever, a question of empirical import, 
and it does not really justify the exclusion 
from the theoretical analysis of the first 
best price-mechanism variety intervention. 
Finally, we may note explicitly that an 
attempted extension of our policy rankings 
to actual policy implementation would have 
to take into account the following, well-
known problems: 
The administration costs and feasibility 
of alternative policies must be taken into 
account. 
Since taxes must be collected to dis-
burse subsidies, the question arises whether 
those who ask for minimum real wages will 
not, even when such taxes are imposed on 
them in a lump sum fashion, ~eek to revise 
the minimum real wage that is demanded. 
We have' a~sumed, of course, that)he :n;tini~ 
mum real wage demanded is independent of 
the tax poli~y chosen. ," : 
ApPENDIX 
We produce numerical examples tO'show 
that: 
A full employment yielding wage sub-
sidy in manufacturing may be inferior to 
laissez-faire. 
The second best wage subsidy in manu-
facturing may be inferior or superior to the 
second best production subsidy to agri-
culture; the two policies cannot be unique-
ly ranked. 
Let us consider the following production 
and utility functions: fA(LA)=L~7",fM(LM) 
=L~, U=PXA+XM • Let p take two al-
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. TABLE 1 
p=1.5 p=0.5 
Minimum Wage = (L't-)-lll 2.363709 1.119195 
First Best Optimum LA 0.821017 0.201660 
XA 0.862510 0.300929 
LM 0.178983 0.798340 
XM 0.423064 0.893499 
U 1:716828 1.043963 
Laissez-Faire Equilibrium LA 0.908222 0.499286 
XA 0.930345 0.593967 
LM 0.044746 0.199585 
XM 0.iH532 0.446749 
U 1.607048 0.743733 
.i 
Second Best Wage Subsidy LA O.9()4517 0.012604 
Equilibrium' XA 0.927497 0.037617 
LM 0.046600 0.987396 
XM 0.21~869 0.993678 
U 1.60 114 1.012486 
Full Employment ,Wage LA 0.051314 0.pI2604 
Subsidy Equilibrium XA 0.107814 0.037617 
LM 0.948684 0.987396 
XM 0.974004 0.993678 
U 1.135726 1.012486 
Second Best Production LA 0.955254 0.800415 
Subsidy Equilibrium XA 0:966249 0.846226 
LM 0.044746 0.199585 
XM' 0.211532 0.446749 
U 1.660906 0.869862 
ternative values 1.5 and 0.5. Let the speci~ 
fied minimum wage (in terms of manu-
factured good) in manufacturing be twice' 
the eqUilibrium wage associated with the 
first best optimum. The' following table 
gives the equilibrium factor allocations, out-
put, and welfare associated with ,each of the 
following policies: first best optimum; 
laissez-faire; second best wage subsidy to 
manufacturing; full employment wage sub-
sidy to manufacturing; and second best pro-
duction subsidy to agriculture. 
It is seen that when p = 0.5, the second 
best optimum wage subsidy· to manufac-
turing happens to be the full employment 
wage subsidy, and it dominates the second 
best production subsidy (to agriculture) 
whereas, when p = 1.5, the second best pro-
duction subsidy dominates the second best 
wage subsidy. Further, the full employment 
wage subsidy is inferior to laissez-faire, when 
p= 1.5. 
• Note that the values fpr U in the table represent a 
global maximqm because p is fixed. 
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